Published January 10, 1996
The Generals in Nigeria surely expected some international reaction when they ordered the hanging of nine political activists, but they probably did not anticipate the intensity of the world's outcry. A few weeks ago The Economist's cover was a drawing of an oil rig blow-out spewing bright red blood, with the headline, "Nigeria Foaming with Blood" . . . not exactly the publicity needed for attracting foreign investment.
But then the military rulers of Nigeria, led by General Sanni Abacha, seem to be unconcerned about frightening away the dozen or so key foreign investors (mostly petroleum companies) in Nigeria. With proven reserves of over 20 billion barrels, and a steady supplier of 10 per cent of the U.S.'s oil imports, Abacha knows he has some economic and political leverage.
In 1993, General Abacha came to power after the nullification of an election which had apparently elected Chief Moshood Abiola as president. Since then, Abacha and his council of generals have banned all political activities, suspended fundamental constitutional rights and arrested Chief Abiola as well as other political leaders including a former head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo. And then last month, Abacha defied the international community's demarches and petitions and ordered Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other political leaders to be hanged for treason.
The reaction to the hangings was swift; the Commonwealth, led primarily by South African President Nelson Mandela, threw Nigeria out of their club and threatened sanctions -- including an oil boycott. The Clinton Administration joined the voices of harsh criticism, but pulled up short of an oil embargo. On a recent visit to South Africa, Vice President Gore told President Mandela that the U.S. would not rule an oil embargo in or out. But he did suggest that for an oil embargo to be effective that it must be multilateral.
President Mandela seems to be taking the lead role in organizing support for a comprehensive set of economic sanctions, including an oil embargo. Mandela's reasoning is simple: the international community needs to apply all necessary pressure -- moral, political, and economic -- in order to change Abacha's repressive behavior, and promote democratic institutions. The goals are certainly honorable even if the details, such as who might replace Abacha and what condition the civilian political leadership is in, remain a bit vague.
In the U.S., Senator Kassebaum has introduced legislation, known as the Nigeria Sanction Bill, that carefully lays out a series of sanctions that can be escalated or reduced, depending on political conditions inside Nigeria. The bill would codify existing policy, including cutting off U.S. foreign assistance, opposing World Bank and IMF loans, banning Nigerian government leaders from visiting the U.S., and prohibiting Eximbank or OPIC financing. In addition, Kassebaum's legislation would prohibit all new U.S. private investment in Nigeria, including investments in the oil sector.
The bill suggests that after 3 months of these moderate sanctions, President Clinton would then report on progress being made toward democracy and human rights. If there has been none, a multilateral oil embargo would be the next step.
Perhaps
General Abacha will decide over the next few months that it would be prudent to
defuse international criticism by easing up on the political opposition and
permiting some kind of democratic process to unfold. If he does not, he can
expect the Nelson Mandelas of the international community to continue to attempt
to tighten Nigeria's already growing isolation.
Principal Author
Walter H. Kansteiner, III is a Senior Associate of The Forum for
International Policy. Most recently he served as Director for African Affairs at
the National Security Council and the Department of State's Policy Planning
Staff.
For
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